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Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy
Vasfi O. Özen
Abstract: Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert
Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative,
but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of
empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his
views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in
his naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited
interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement
with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because
Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary
theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the
scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which
appears most clearly in Dawn.
Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this.
Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among
those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been
simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of
empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I
believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration.1 Com-
mentators have been interested in Nietzsche’s naturalistic2 accounts of
other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in
1 Even though a large body of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of
compassion (e.g., Frazer 2006; Bamford 2007; Von Tevenar 2007; Panaïoti 2013; Harris
2017), his theory of empathy has by and large received a scant attention.
2 In the secondary literature, some emphasized the ‘methodological’ aspect of Nietzsche’s
naturalism (Leiter 2002), and others its ‘artful’ aspect (Acampora 2013). Here I do not take
any substantial position on the subject. For the purposes of this paper, I (minimally)
assume that Nietzsche appeals to naturalism primarily as a critical tool by which to counter
metaphysical assumptions.
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his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagree-
ment with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is
surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has
views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than
others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship
and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of
empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn.
Nietzsche develops his theory of empathy mainly in reaction to
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical understanding of compassion. According to
Schopenhauer, in compassion, we have an unmediated perceptual access
to another’s inner state. This is a paradoxical phenomenon in the sense
that it violates the principle of individuation. It goes against the way we
ordinarily perceive others, by means of spatiotemporal intuition,
as different and separate from us. An adequate and plausible explanation
of compassion, Schopenhauer holds, can by no means ‘be reached on the
purely psychologicalpath’; suchexplanation ‘canbearrivedatonlymetaphy-
sically’, because, in compassion, we overcome the individuation of the ego
and find ourselves, in an unusual way, immediately drawn to the other
person’s suffering (BM 147). His suffering touches us directly as if ‘it is
precisely in his person, not in ours, that we feel the suffering’ (BM 147), as
if we ‘share the suffering in him, in spite of the fact that his skin does not
enclose [our] nerves’ (BM 166). When we empathize, ‘the individuality
and fate of others are treated entirely like one’s own’ (WWR I 375), such
that one’s concern for others is exactly as strong as one’s concern for one’s
own welfare. This suggests that, for Schopenhauer, other-oriented concern
is necessarily built into the nature of empathy. Schopenhauer also claims
that an ability for empathic attunement and responsiveness is an innate
human disposition, i.e., ‘it is original and immediate, it resides in human
nature itself’ (BM 148–149). Nietzsche dismisses this account of empathy
and argues that a perfectly naturalistic account is possible.
Avoiding the metaphysical excesses of Schopenhauer’s account was criti-
cal for Nietzsche to establish his own understanding of empathy as well as
its difference from and relation to other emotional phenomena such as
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compassion, the feeling of identification or oneness, and empathic
concern. One general characteristic of Nietzsche’s social–psychological
explanations of empathy that deserves mention is that they anticipate the
naturalism of his later writings. In this paper, I will spell out in detail the
contrasting approaches of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and draw attention
to the naturalistic strain in Nietzsche’s thinking about empathy.
At this point, a terminological note is appropriate. By ‘empathy’, I mean an
affective responsiveness to the emotional state of another person, which
includes an ability to share in that person’s emotions and understand what
he or she is experiencing. Unless the context states otherwise, I use the term
‘sympathy’ here to refer broadly to a sense of psychological closeness and per-
ceived similarity to others, which entails a feeling of oneness between individ-
uals. There is a significant difference between Schopenhauer’s and
Nietzsche’s understanding of ‘feeling of oneness’. The feeling of oneness, for
Schopenhauer, is a somewhat mystical intuition of numerical oneness with
other individuals. For Nietzsche, however, fellow feeling involves a sense of
being in solidarity with others who share a similar experience, yet still recogniz-
ing one another’s numerical distinctiveness.Mitleid (literally ‘sufferingwith’, or
typically translated as ‘compassion’), for Schopenhauer, consists of three dis-
tinct but interrelated components, namely, the cognitive capacity to represent
another’s internal state, the affective participation in another’s experience, and
amotivation to care for others andexpress concern for their well-being. I follow
the contemporary psychological usage and call themotivational component of
compassion ‘empathic concern’, which corresponds to Nietzsche’s notion of
‘sympathetic affection’(sympathischeAffection;D143).Empathicconcernor sym-
pathetic affection, broadly construed, refers to any other-oriented tendency to
respond to the well-being of someone in distress. For Schopenhauer, the
empathically concerned witness to another’s distress helps simply because she
desires to alleviate that suffering. Schopenhauer claims that only perception
of and affective participation in another’s distress (i.e., ‘empathic distress’)
incites genuine empathic concern. Based on this conceptual framework, com-
passion can be defined as empathy (i.e., comprehending and sharing in
another’s emotional state) plus empathic concern (i.e., an other-oriented
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concern elicited by the perceived needs of another individual), both of which,
for Schopenhauer, go together and necessarily entail each other. Nietzsche
operateswitha similarconceptual framework.Yet,hedenies that these twocom-
ponents, empathy and other-oriented concern, necessarily go together and
form a unit. He also dismisses Schopenhauer’s claim that other-oriented
concern arises solely out of empathic distress (BM 146). I suggest that, for
Nietzsche, the prospect of vicariously sharing in another’s joy at overcoming
some need or adversity (i.e., ‘empathic joy’) carries more motivational force
for genuine sympathetic affection than mere empathic distress does.
A quick remark about my methodology and aim may be helpful as
well. Perhaps I should first highlight that I do not offer a Nietzschean
theory of empathy, but rather I attempt to analyze Nietzsche’s theory of
empathy (Theorie der Mitempfindung), as well as discuss in footnotes its sig-
nificance and relevance for contemporary psychological research
(especially for the reader with interest in the specific details). One might
point out that Nietzsche’s goal in articulating a theory of empathy is not
just to confront Schopenhauer’s views on compassion and suggest that he
has a better way to explain this phenomenon. There is something more
at work. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy cannot be understood without a dis-
cussion of its normative implications, specifically, its ultimate aim in liberat-
ing the reader from the presumptions and prejudices of morality. I aim to
give a balanced account of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, by acknowled-
ging both the positive and negative elements of this construct. But in an
attempt to do justice to the complexity of the subject matter, I limit my
focus to psychological and social aspects of the theory and defer any sub-
stantial discussion of normative implications for another project (see foot-
note 8).3
We now come to the plan of the paper. In Section 1, I set out Nietzsche’s
discussion of sympathy, alliance, and social instinct in Human, All Too
3 Thanks to Matthew Meyer who pressed me on this point concerning the methodology and
aim during the 2021 Central APA where I presented a shorter version of the material as a sym-
posium paper.
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Human, describing how human beings come to experience a subjective
sense of perceived similarity to one another, which in turn reveals the
beginnings of empathic responding. While Nietzsche’s central idea
here, that having some degree of sympathetic attunement and shared
feeling is a prerequisite for empathy, is intriguing, it is not fully substan-
tiated, nor does it help to shed sufficient light on his understanding of
empathy. The main goal of Section 2 is to show that, for Nietzsche,
empathy relies on an originally non-moral or amoral capacity to understand
another’s state of mind by means of their expressions, a capacity that is only
later moralized. Here I use “non-moral” or “amoral” in the sense of not
necessarily being motivated by a concern for others’ well-being. I discuss
the preeminent interpretive issues in the secondary literature relating to
the essentially fear driven character of empathic response. What is distinc-
tive about Nietzsche’s naturalistic approach is its attempt to explore the
origin and development of empathy and other-oriented concern at both
the evolutionary and the psychological level. In my view, however, this
attempt, despite its promising start, does not fully succeed. I begin my analy-
sis by examining Nietzsche’s theory of empathy (Mitempfindung), as pre-
sented in D, paying particular attention to the basic psychological
mechanisms behind empathy and its evolutionary significance. I suggest
that, for Nietzsche, empathy is a special form of imaginative or represen-
tational activity whose function is to convey a sense of alliance and connec-
tion with others. I then turn to Nietzsche’s views on mimicry and its socially
adaptive functions in D. Specifically, I examine Nietzsche’s views on the
origin of mimicry as well as its role in understanding the emotions of
others, creating greater feelings of affiliation and liking between individ-
uals, and facilitating helping behavior. Next, I examine Nietzsche’s key
insights into the nature and emergence of human sociality. I argue that,
for Nietzsche, social instinct in humans, i.e., the propensity to engage
with and enjoy intimate and interpersonal relationships, is not primary,
but rather acquired, that is, the human individual has a certain genetic
potential to learn and become a social being if given the conducive environ-
ment. This social instinct evolves and gives rise to empathy and sympathetic
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orientations towards others. I conclude my analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of
empathy by briefly contrasting it with Schopenhauer’s metaphysical
account. In Section 3, I outline Nietzsche’s understanding of fellow
feeling and empathic concern in contrast to Schopenhauer’s account. I
discuss Nietzsche’s different evaluations of sympathetic affection in D
and HH. I end in Section 4 by noting what my analysis reveals about
Nietzsche’s thinking on empathy.
1. Sense of Alliance, Sociality, and Sympathetic Agreement
HH(1878) contains someofNietzsche’s earliest explorations of the empathic
process, its emergence, and its effect on prosocial sensibilities and
behavior, which are crucial insofar as they provide the basic framework for
his later, more mature and complex explanations of empathy and other
related phenomena, such as compassion and the motivation to attend to
the needs of others. Nietzsche’s aim here is to expose the metaphysical
excesses of philosophy by adopting a historical perspective in approaching
the issues of moral psychology. To illustrate this, I would like to begin my
analysis by considering the following passage in which Nietzsche hypoth-
esizes about how a feeling of sympathetic and mutual understanding
emerges and leads to a sense of “alliance” (Bündniss) between individuals,
and how such heightened “feeling of with-ness” (Mitgefühl), in turn, sets up
the possibility for “concern for others” (Fürsorge für Andere):
Pleasure and social instinct—From our relations with other people, we gain a new
class of pleasures beyond those sensations of pleasure that we get from our-
selves, thereby considerably extending the realm of pleasurable sensations.
Much that pertains to this has perhaps come down to us from animals, who
obviously feel pleasure when they play with one another, especially mothers
with their young. And then consider sexual relations, which make almost
every female seem interesting to every male in regard to pleasure, and vice
versa. In general, the sensation of pleasure based upon human relations
makes human beings better; the joy that is shared, the pleasure that is
enjoyed together, is enhanced; it reassures the individual, makes him better-
natured, dispels mistrust, envy: for he feels happy himself and sees others
feeling happy in the same way. Similar expressions of pleasure awaken the
phantasy of empathy, a feeling of being somewhat alike [die Phantasie der
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Mitempfindung, das Gefühl etwas Gleiches zu sein]: common sufferings, the same
storms, dangers, enemies do the same thing, too. On this, then, the oldest alli-
ance is built: the import of which is, everyone together turns away and defends
against threatened displeasure for the benefit of every individual. And thus the
social instinct [sociale Instinct] grows forth from pleasure (HH I 98; translation
slightly modified).
What is distinctive about Nietzsche’s approach here is that our other-
oriented tendencies are shaped by a combination of natural selection and
adaptation to a changing environment. It incorporates biologically
evolved mechanisms as well as socially determined experiences and
exposures. Elaborating on the precise relation between the biological
and the social in the origin and development of empathy (which entails
assuming another’s emotional perspective and feeling concern for their
welfare) will be one of my central tasks in what follows. Humans, according
to Nietzsche, have inherited from animals many instinctual tendencies
that emerge under certain conditions, one of which involves our gregarious-
ness, i.e., our instinct for living in groups and our desire to be with others
andbe acceptedby them.ElsewhereNietzschepoints out that the ‘protocols’
of a ‘social morality’ such as a basic sense of alliance and the existence of
some form of social organization and cooperative endeavor ‘can be found,
in crude form, everywhere, even down to the deepest depths of the animal
world’ (D 26).4 But Nietzsche also seems to embrace here the idea that it
is through a long socialization process that humans have generally
adapted to living in a social community with one another.
An implicit assumption in Nietzsche’s discussion in HH I 98 is that safety
and livelihood are always among one’s paramount considerations. And
Nietzsche appears to be suggesting that human beings are inclined
towards interpersonal relationships primarily to satisfy such needs. After
all, a life in which one is accepted, valued, and protected by others is
4 Considerable empirical evidence supports Nietzsche’s claim. As the primatologist Frans de
Waal notes, ‘Alliances (either to defend oneself against aggression or to collectively defeat or
overthrow rivals) are among the best documented forms of cooperation in primatology, invol-
ving many studies and thousands of observations’ (2015, 66).
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better than a life in which one is at the mercy of external influences or one
is always on guard (provided that safety is one’s primary concern). But
besides these perceived rewards of group living, Nietzsche hypothesizes,
interpersonal relationships also produce intrinsic benefits for the individ-
uals within such relationships. Simply put, it feels good to be accepted
and cared for. But it feels good to see others do good as well; and it feels
even better when we contribute to one another’s well-being. And it is this
feature of interpersonal relationships, Nietzsche points out, that ultimately
transforms the way the individual sees, feels, and acts towards other people.
Having a sense of confidence and trust in one’s community inclines inter-
actants to feel positive regard towards one another and take pleasure in
being embedded in the same social structure. And based on the success
of our empathic attunement, i.e., the accuracy with which we are tuned
in to the subjectivity of others, we ‘gradually habituate ourselves to
feeling the same way as those around us, and because sympathetic agree-
ment and mutual understanding [sympathisches Zustimmen und Sichverstehen]
are so pleasant, we soon bear all the signs and partisan colors of our sur-
roundings’ (HH I 371). This way of coming to occupy a similar psychologi-
cal state to that of the other person, in turn, promotes social bonding (i.e., a
sense of alliance and connectedness). Consequently, individuals now relate
to one another’s experiences more easily because they experience and
witness each other experiencing a sense of sympathy, i.e., the feeling that
other members of the group are sort of like myself. In sum, Nietzsche’s
view here is that social interactions awaken the imaginative or represen-
tational capacities of empathy. It is these awakened capacities of empathy
that Nietzsche seems to suggest facilitate our sharing in the emotional
content of others and attaining a mutual sympathetic bond of some sort,
out of which a sense of alliance and fellowship ensues.
I believe Nietzsche’s above assertions about human sociality and sympa-
thy are likely to be informed by Friedrich Albert Lange’s critical exposition
of the psychological views of the French Moralists, especially of the eight-
eenth century. In a representative passage from his History of Materialism
and Critique of Its Present Importance (1866), a work Nietzsche was highly
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acquainted with, Lange cites Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s emphasis on the
importance of ‘sympathy’ as the basis for the development of prosocial
feelings and other-oriented concern: ‘“We are enriched in a manner by the
good that we do, we participate in the joy that we confer”’ (History of
Materialism, Vol. II, 84). However, Lange points out that a more elegant and
explicit expression of this idea is to be found in Comte de Volney’s
Catechism of the French Citizen: ‘Nature, it is there said, has organized man
for society. “In givinghim sensations, she so organised him that the sensations
of others are mirrored in him, and awaken answering sensations of pleasure,
of pain, of sympathy, that make the charm and indissoluble bond of society”’
(History of Materialism, Vol. II, 85). Put simply, Volney’s basic idea here
seems to be that the capacity to share another person’s emotions with
mutual susceptibility provides a basis for social bonding. Both La Mettrie
and Volney view the human tendency for sociality and affiliation as involving
progressively more sophisticated capacities such as understanding others’
emotional and mental states, engaging with others’ needs, and converting
sympathy into concern and hence to prosocial behavior. In at least one
respect, Volney’s analysis of social instinct in terms of primary other-oriented
drives towards group cohesion comes closer to Nietzsche’s. Yet I believe
Nietzsche seems to emphasize more than La Mettrie and Volney do how
the social context influences and redirects our other-oriented tendencies.
In HH I 98 Nietzsche concentrates on certain prosocial tendencies in
humans that are, seemingly, the necessary indicators of the beginnings of
empathic awareness and responding. Yet, and this is an important point,
for Nietzsche, these prosocial processes and affective mechanisms by
which emotional states spread from one person to another do not give
rise to genuine empathy but to a kind of imaginary or fancied empathy.
Also, Nietzsche’s explanation in HH I 371 concerns only how in order to
avoid conflict conspecifics tend to develop similar feelings, emotions, and
experiences when facing similar situations, which can contribute to
enhanced collaboration among the group members. However, this again
does not concern empathy but rather the question of how members of a
group come to share the same emotional mind set or attunement, how
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they come to develop an understanding and a sensibility of their environ-
ment. The above passages about human sociality do not contain any expla-
nation of either how we come to feel the specific emotion a specific person
might come to feel on a specific occasion, or how human beings in general
come to recognize and acknowledge one another’s feelings of sadness, fear,
etc. In other words, it is not entirely clear how exactly we ought to under-
stand the phrase, “the phantasy of empathy” in the context of identifying
with someone’s emotional state. I believe this rather puzzling phrase only
begins to make sense once we turn to Nietzsche’s account of emotional rep-
resentation of a specific experience in D 142 in the next section.
Now, judging from the above discussion, Nietzsche’s account clearly
does not provide a satisfactory analysis and therefore leaves many gaps to
be filled in. One wonders, for instance, what are the psychological mechan-
isms that underlie sociality in humans? And most significantly, how did we
become more considerate of others? Identifying and individuating the
primary psychological processes involved in the act of empathic responding
to another’s experience will be important for our understanding of
Nietzsche’s position. In the next section, I will attempt to address these
issues from Nietzsche’s point of view.
2. Mimicry and the Phantasy of Empathy
In D (1881) Nietzsche outlines a naturalistic theory of Mitempfindung5
(literally ‘feeling with’ or alternatively translated as ‘empathy’), mainly in
5 In 1835, the physiologist Johannes Müller coined the term ‘Mitempfindung’ to describe the
phenomenon in which a stimulus applied in one area of the body is felt as an itch in a different
area of the body—a term still used both in English and non-English published medical litera-
ture. Müller defines this phenomenon as follows: ‘Sometimes one sensation excites another,
or the sensations spread morbidly further than the affected parts. These phenomena, which
I call Mitempfindungen, are not rare in healthy life’ (Handbuch der Physiologie, Vol. 1, 680; my
translation). Nietzsche was familiar with this seminal work (possibly through Friedrich
Albert Lange). Yet, it is not certain whether he appropriated the term fromMüller. According
to the historian Ute Frevert (2011, 176–177), the term was reintroduced in the 1847 edition of
the German Brockhaus as the ‘spontaneous imitation of somebody else’s sentiment’, and this
basic definition has remained the same over the years.
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reaction to Schopenhauer’s understanding of the empathic process. This
theory seeks to answer important questions such as ‘What is empathy?’,
‘What are the potential antecedents of empathic process?’, ‘Why has
empathy evolved?’, and ‘What evolutionary function does empathy serve?’
Although they are far from exhaustive, Nietzsche’s reflections on the origin
and nature of empathy offer a highly compelling and viable perspective.
Empathy.—In order to understand another person, in other words, to reproduce
his feeling in ourselves, we do indeed from time to time return to the reason for
his feeling one way or another and ask, for instance: Why is this person
depressed?—In order, then, for the same reason, to experience the same
depression ourselves; but it is much more common to dispense with this and
to produce the feeling in ourselves according to the effects it exerts and displays
on the other person in that we reproduce with our body (at least we approach a
faint similarity in the play of muscle and in innervation) the expression of his
eyes, his voice, his gait, his bearing…Then there arises in us a similar feeling,
as a result of an age-old association between movement and sensation [in
Folge einer alten Association von Bewegung und Empfindung], which have been
thoroughly conditioned to move back and forth from one to the other. We
have come a long way in developing this skill for understanding other
people’s feelings, and in the presence of another person we are, almost auto-
matically, always employing it: observe in particular the play of lineaments on
the faces of women, how they quiver and glitter from ceaseless reproduction
and mirroring [Nachbilden und Wiederspiegeln] of everything that is being
sensed around them… If we ask ourselves how the reproduction of other
people’s feelings has become such second nature for us, there can be no
doubt about the answer: as the most timorous of all creatures, the human
being, by virtue of his subtle and fragile nature, has had in his timidity the
instructress of that empathy, of that rapid understanding for the feelings of
others (and of animals as well)…When I proceed from a theory of empathy
[Mitempfindung] such as I have presented here and then consider the contem-
porary favorite and downright sacred theory of a mystical process, by virtue of
which compassion [Mitleid] transforms two essential beings into one and to
such an extent that each is vouchsafed unmediated understanding of the
other… such a clear-headed thinker as Schopenhauer took pleasure in such
rapturous and worthless poppycock. (D 142)
Commentators are almost unanimous in interpreting Nietzsche’s con-
ception of empathy here as a primarily fear-driven capacity with an atten-
tional focus on the perceived weaknesses of others. Ruth Abbey, for
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instance, points out that Nietzsche’s main goal in D 142 is ‘to discredit
empathetic feeling by showing it to emanate from fear and mistrust’
(2000, 63). It is due to this fear-driven nature, Richardson claims,
‘Nietzsche’s empathy seems not to care for its objects in any way that will
lead to benefiting actions’ and therefore manifests itself as an ‘aggressive
curiosity into the limitations of other people’ (2004, 180). Rebecca
Bamford expands on these suggestions, noting that ‘this theory of
empathy provides a drive-based psycho-physiological explanation for the
way in which customary morality consistently reinforces a social mood
of superstitious fear’ (2018, 33). Keith Ansell-Pearson and Michael Ure
claim that the core of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy is primarily epistemic,
not social (or ethical, for that matter). More specifically, Nietzsche’s theory
construes empathy as a matter of a singular individual actively utilizing cog-
nitive processes to infer others’ mental states to exert power over and/or
control over them (2017, 286, n. 18). This interpretation is now taken to
be the standard rendering of Nietzsche’s own understanding of empathy
and empathetic responding inside and outside Nietzsche scholarship.
Elisa Aaltola, for instance, writes in her Varieties of Empathy that, ‘The
epitome of the disconnected cognitive empathizer is nothing less than a
Nietzschean individual, dizzy under the spell of competitive, hierarchical,
manipulative and egoistic desires for control over others’ (2018, 63–64).
There are two things to be noted here. First, the commentators seem to
overestimate the epistemic credentials of empathy. From early on,
Nietzsche had been skeptical of the accuracy of our empathic inferences,
about which he says, they ‘are premature and have to be so’ (HH I 32).
And we see him maintaining such skepticism throughout his later writings.
Consider the following passage, for instance:
In an animated conversation I often see the face of the person with whom I am
talking so clearly and so subtly determined in accordance with the thought he
expresses, or that I believe has been produced in him, that this degree of
clarity far surpasses my powers of vision: so the subtle shades of the play of the
muscles and the expression of the eyes must have beenmade up by me. Probably
the person made an altogether different face, or none at all. (BGE 192)
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Nietzsche’s concern here is with the psycho-physiological structure of our
empathic experience, the way we perceive or imagine the cues and
signals others give us. According to Ansell-Pearson and Ure, ‘empathy is
motivated by a purely selfish greed to appropriate others’ eyes for the
sake of expanding or refining one’s own vision’ (2017, 286, n. 18). Yet, in
BGE 192, Nietzsche speaks of how we tend to misunderstand others in
empathy. He seems to doubt the unique power of empathic vision to
provide us with a deep, multiperspectival understanding of another’s sub-
jective experience.
Second, indeed, in D, Nietzsche unambiguously speaks of empathic
receptivity as rooted in our fear of the unknown, or of others’ reactions,
feelings, and intuitions about us, and how such receptivity, in turn, contrib-
utes to the social transfer of fear between individuals. Nietzsche also con-
cedes that our striving for distinction in social life moves us to keep a
constant watch on others to know their thoughts and emotional states,
‘but the empathy [die Mitempfindung] and the being-in-the-know, which
this drive requires for its gratification, are far from harmless or compassio-
nate or benevolent’ (D 113). What both HH and D have in common is a call
to examine the nature and characteristics of moral sensations through rig-
orous psychological analysis and observation so that we can recover and
redeem from the illusions of religious and metaphysical assumptions that
still inform and shape our moral thinking. In HH, Nietzsche especially
brings to our attention that ‘a false ethics is constructed on the basis of
an erroneous analysis of’ moral phenomena (HH I 37). And in the
preface added later to the first volume of HH (1886), he announces his
intention in ‘speaking immorally, extramorally, “beyond good and evil”’
to identify and explore the non-moral origins and function of morality
(HH I “Preface” 1). In D, he makes more explicit this naturalistic, immor-
alist project ‘to undermine our trust in morality’ (D 2), by demonstrating
what we tend to highly value or deem to be sacred to be ignoble, suspicious,
lowly, and all-too-human. However, we should be careful in interpreting
these seemingly immoral, or anti-moral, statements, especially those regard-
ing empathy and its role within customary morality. As Ansell-Pearson and
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Bamford correctly observe, in D, and I would say also in HH, the ultimate
goal of Nietzsche’s critique is to open up space for ‘a free and creative
ethical imagination… through rejection of mindless adherence to com-
passion-based morality’ (2020, 109). In this regard, it needs to be high-
lighted that Nietzsche’s position on empathy is far more multifaceted
than it might initially appear. The objectives of both HH and D do not
necessarily coincide even though they certainly feed into one another. In
D, Nietzsche is more concerned with a critique and investigation into the
foundation of our moral beliefs, the specific ways in which empathy can
be deployed to dominate or deceive others. Or similarly, he describes
how excess empathic tendencies can be detrimental to the individual and
society. In HH, on the other hand, Nietzsche indicates the possibility of
an alternative approach to the ethical by drawing out some of empathy’s
more positive and transformative qualities, but, in my view, he does not
fully articulate this until his later writings. He remarks on the social instinct
for establishing relations, on the human tendency to observe and imitate
prosocial behaviors without any moral underpinnings–expressing specifi-
cally his positive regard for our susceptibility to catch others’ joy (i.e.,
empathic joy) rather than their suffering (i.e., empathic distress). The
Nietzsche of HH seems to lay the emphasis more on empathy’s potential
role in undermining feelings of antagonism and facilitating a state of sym-
pathetic agreement and mutual understanding between individuals. What
seems to be far less highlighted and discussed by the commentators is
that the key passages such as HH I 98 regarding the pleasures of social inter-
action, HH I 216 regarding social mimicry, and HH I 371 regarding sym-
pathetic agreement clearly suggest that Nietzsche singles out empathy as
key to establishing increased other-oriented relationships, trust, and
social closeness. I will say more in the next section on Nietzsche’s under-
standing of sympathetic affection and comment on his differing assess-
ments of its nature and significance.
In the light of this textual context and overview of the major interpretive
issues surrounding Nietzsche’s views on empathy, I would now like to more
closely examine his theory in D 142. The discussion in that passage can be
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divided into three parts: the basic cognitive–affective mechanisms and pro-
cesses in empathy; a quasi-evolutionary account of empathy; and
Nietzsche’s criticism of Schopenhauer’s characterization of empathic
process. Let us begin with the first part. Here I understand Nietzsche to
be characterizing empathy as comprising three antecedent conditions: (i)
a basic vicarious emotional reaction to emotional stimuli, specifically to
the perceived emotional experience of the other person (following
Nietzsche’s terminology, let us call this process of ‘emotion perception
(Wahrnehmung) and reproduction (Nachbilden)’ simply ‘mirroring (Wieder-
spiegeln)’), (ii) coming to grasp the reason for or motive behind another’s
emotional response (I will call this state ‘representational emotional
knowing’), and (iii) perceived emotional synchrony with others or
emotional communion (e.g., feelings such as ‘We all felt as one despite
our differences’). Contemporary psychology uses the term ‘self-transcen-
dent emotions’ to describe complex emotions such as sympathy and com-
passion that enable one to move beyond one’s narrow self-concern and
take an other-oriented perspective.6 Following Nietzsche’s own terminol-
ogy, I will refer to this condition as ‘sympathetic agreement’, which is
based on ‘the phantasy of empathy’, that is, the experience of seeing
someone else as like oneself in the way he currently feels.
Now, let us elaborate on this model of empathy. The first thing that
needs to be clarified is what one’s coming to grasp the reason for another’s
emotional response entails. Even though Nietzsche is not explicit about
what exactly constitutes ‘representational emotional knowing’, which
creates problems of interpretation, some tentative suggestions can never-
theless be offered. The reason for another’s emotional response could
mean any of the following:7
(a) The real or underlying causes of the person’s emotional
experience.
6 See Stellar et al. 2017 for an illuminating account of this concept.
7 The following discussion on how we come to grasp the reason for another’s emotional
response incorporates the written critical comments and suggestions of Paul Katsafanas.
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(b) The person’s beliefs about these causes.
(c) Facts about what (if anything) justifies the emotional response.
(d) The person’s beliefs about what justifies the emotional response.
One may claim these can all come apart. Let us illustrate this with an
example on the same theme as Nietzsche’s own example in D
142. Suppose that I come across a friend who is feeling very depressed.
Let us further assume the following:
(a)* The real cause of my friend’s depression is a general dissatisfaction
with life, or loss of sense of direction and purpose.
(b)* Her belief about the cause of her depression is that she just lost out
on a really good job.
(c)* Almost a year ago, she started withdrawing from friends and family,
losing interest in activities that were once a source of fulfillment and
strength to her.
(d)* Her justification for her depression is that she can no longer pursue
a career that she felt was more aligned with her interests.
Now the immediate question is, when I empathize with my friend, am I sup-
posed to discern (a)*, (b)*, (c)*, or (d)*? Presumably, one may say, not
(a)* or (c)*. This would be too demanding and would involve a more
detached, analytical stance. So presumably it would be (b)* or (d)*.
But then this brings us to several issues. First, in cases like the one we
described, the person who is the target of empathy has an inaccurate con-
ception of her own emotional state. In the above example, my friend thinks
she is experiencing depression (and correctly so), but she might better be
described as experiencing something else: a general dissatisfaction with life,
or loss of sense of direction and purpose. Even if we can reasonably describe
this as a case of depression, the depression is only the surface of what seems
to be happening in the larger dynamic. When I empathize with my friend,
presumably I am supposed to be mirroring her depression rather than the
larger emotional complex of which it is part. But then, one may ask, what
are we supposed to be doing when we think about the reasons for the
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emotional response? The critic might say that my friend’s own beliefs about
what causes or justifies her emotion will be inaccurate, because she will not
see what the emotion is and how it connects to the larger psychological
dynamics. Many passages in Nietzsche’s writings actually support this
idea. Nietzsche contends that we are typically very bad at self-observation
and self-understanding in that we tend to be less aware of the deep com-
plexity of our mental processes (see HH II 223, D 119, GS 112). So, my
friend may have some belief such as ‘I am depressed because I lost out
on a really good job’, but this belief is at best incomplete and is probably
distorting as well. So, the critic might ask, when I empathize with my
friend, am I just supposed to pick up this incomplete/distorted belief?
In response to the critic, I should first point out that empathy in its
elemental, basic form, as ‘mirroring’ is far from being sufficient to help us
appreciate and understand another’s subjective emotional experience.
And what we discern in our empathic encounters are not typically facts
about another’s emotional life, i.e., (a)* or (c)*. However, because of our
shared experiences, I can more reliably predict, understand (at least to
some degree), and respond appropriately to my friend’s depression and its
underlying aspects. I may, for instance, quickly infer that her depression is
not simply due to a loss of employment opportunity (on the basis of what I
know about other relevant facts of her life). Even though she may not, by
herself, be able to fully cope with all the intricacies of her emotional life, I
may help her formulate her feelings and thoughts through my mirroring
and reflecting on her experiences. And Nietzsche indeed allows for the possi-
bility of deeper communication and mutual understanding among friends
and acquaintances (see GS 338). Granted that, normally we do not have
such ready access to others’ emotional life; rather, the only access we have
is an indirect one, which is often affected by a distorted or generalized
version of our own mental lives (see GS 354, KSA 11, 34 [46], KSA 11, 37
[4]). And I also recognize that the influences of motives on cognition are
so pervasive and so complex that emotions we recognize in others usually dis-
sipate or become trivialized in the process of being shared, hence not allow-
ing for the true meaning of the emotional experiences of individuals to be
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exposed. Furthermore, we do not necessarily experience others’ emotions
with the same intensity and accuracy as they do.8
Based on the above framework, at least four conclusions can be drawn
concerning empathy’s general function. First, ‘mirroring’ is constitutive
of all forms of empathy, which enables us to begin to process the emotional
content of our interactions with others.
Second, empathy, in its fully fledged form, requires effort because we have
no direct access to another’s mental life, and empathy often involves focusing
on the aspects of a mental life that are unfamiliar to us. In other words, one
may not understand all dimensions of another’s experiential state.
Third, empathy comes in degrees and can be manifested by a simple
affective match involving automatic processes of mimicry and synchrony
of bodily action, and at times evolving to a more complex form of psycho-
logical understanding that arises in the imaginative transposition of oneself
into another’s emotional state or context. The ability to empathize depends
on one’s ability to relate the empathized feeling back to oneself.
Fourth, one important factor that affects empathy is the feelings of simi-
larity or dissimilarity: empathy is likely to manifest differently when the
other is perceived to be more similar to than dissimilar from oneself. Fur-
thermore, empathetic interactions are likely to be positively influenced
by the feelings of commonality and bonds of mutual understanding (Sich-
verstehen). Here it should be highlighted that mutual understanding does
not necessarily mean that individuals gain immediate or accurate insight
8 In this paper, I give a very broad characterization of empathy and empathic concern. For
Nietzsche, our natural empathic dispositions can develop and be expressed either in
unhealthy ways, on the basis of some shared, false beliefs and conceptions about ourselves
(one may call this ‘herd-perspective’), or in healthier ways. Nietzsche, I think, operates
implicitly with the distinction between ‘herd-empathy’ (or what he callsMitleid or compassion)
and healthier expressions of empathy that ultimately provide the possibility of a heightened
awareness of one’s self in relation to others through gaining greater control over one’s
emotional responses. And this healthier kind of empathy, for Nietzsche, stands in the
service of human freedom; such empathy leads to self-understanding and understanding of
others, which in turn helps us connect with a higher human culture. I call such empathy
‘anticipatory empathy’ and have argued for its significance for Nietzsche in a different
paper (see my ‘Nietzsche’s Compassion’, forthcoming in Nietzsche-Studien).
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into one another’s emotional states, i.e., their underlying motivations and
causes. Rather, mutual understanding minimally implies a felt similarity or
a sense of interpersonal congruence among group members with respect to
subjective meanings and the ways in which individuals experience the social
world and act in it.
Onmy reading of D 142, if only the first antecedent condition of empathy
(i.e., mirroring) is met, then one would simply enter a state of emotional con-
tagion, the most primitive antecedent of empathy. Such receptiveness to
another’s emotional cues most often occurs at an automatic or unconscious
level, without the awareness that one’s vicarious response is caused by
another’s emotional state, and, for that matter, it does not involve an inten-
tionality that is directed towards the other or presuppose any sort of under-
standing of what the other is experiencing and the feelings associated with
that experience. Affective contagion is spontaneous and immediate; it does
not require any cognitive effort or attention.
Nietzsche’s model of empathy (setting aside its seemingly sexist assump-
tions9) starts from the observation that people tend to synchronize their
postures, mannerisms, vocal productions, and facial expressions to those
with whom they interact. These mechanisms of motor and affective
mimicry, in turn, enable individuals to attune to one another’s subjective
experience, and eventually facilitate the processes of emotion perception
and reproduction. Specifically, observing others’ emotional displays
elicits certain physiological impressions on our senses and body. Through
these impressions, we initially come to recognize someone’s expressed be-
havior as a psychologically meaningful signal. It is worth stressing that, for
Nietzsche, our perceptions of others’ behaviors are not perceptions of a
string of bare, meaningless physical signs. It is not that our intersubjective
9 Nietzsche’s specific emphasis on women’s tendency to mimic others or catch others’
emotional facial expressions does not sound flattering to me. One may, nevertheless,
suggest that Nietzsche is implicitly admonishing women to strategically exploit their prowess
in mimicry to get ahead in a prevailingly sexist culture. For the purposes of this paper, I
remain silent on how best to understand Nietzsche’s sexist or seemingly sexist remarks
about women.
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interactions occur as if we first observe some movements and then attribute
to them a specific psychological meaning. As indicated in D 142, a recipro-
cal interchange necessarily obtains throughout between sensation (Empfin-
dung) and movement (Bewegung), or in other words, between perception
and action.10 And it is due to this interchange that we readily recognize
emotions expressed in body movement or sense (empfinden) the external
signs of another’s affect without necessarily experiencing the same affect.
For instance, when I see you sinking into a chair with a deep sigh, I auto-
matically read your emotional signals or catch your emotional clues and
share in your feeling of sadness.
Our initial reactions to others’ (emotionally) expressive acts are visceral
and automatic; thus, in some instances they may fail to penetrate conscious-
ness and generate a distinct representational state in our minds. For
instance, one is often tuned to react to another’s emotional signal
without any awareness that one’s vicarious distress is simply caused by the
other’s distress. The emotion experienced as a result of such unconscious
and involuntary re-enactment of an observed emotional expression does
not count as representational emotional knowing. Representational
emotional knowing occurs only when one is aware that one’s own represen-
tational state is caused by the interaction with the other.
One may wonder at this point how exactly we make the transition from
automatic (i.e., subconscious) perceptual processing of emotional
impressions to knowing (or believing) something about another’s inner
state. Although he is not explicit about this point, D 142 gives us some
ground to speculate that, for Nietzsche, our emotional impressions of
others typically elicit a corresponding (emotional) content from our
memory, which, in turn, helps awaken attention (and excite interest)
10 For the parallels between Nietzsche’s theory and modern theories of empathy, see Preston
(2007, 428–33). According to Preston (2007, 429), Lipps (1903) was apparently the first to
propose the idea that shared representations provide the cognitive basis for perceiving and
generating action. Yet, I maintain, the elements of a perception–action model are already
present in Nietzsche’s theory of Mitempfindung. I believe that I am the first to recognize the
connection between Nietzsche’s theory and the contemporary perception–action model.
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towards another’s movement and emotionality. Once our attention is
directed to a particular individual and his/her experiential state, we can
then form ideas and reason about that individual’s feelings and needs.
From all this it follows that it is only when the first and second con-
ditions, namely ‘mirroring’ and ‘representational emotional knowing’,
are met together that one has the potential to discern, to varying degrees
and varying degrees of success, another’s emotional state, to understand
its causes and effects, as well as to sense what attitudes, decisions, and
actions will likely to follow from such state. Yet, in order for fully fledged
empathy to exist, all three conditions need to be present. Here Nietzsche’s
claim, taken in conjunction with his previous analysis of ‘sympathetic agree-
ment’ in HH, seems to be that empathy in its highest form involves an
increased mutual awareness and understanding, in which each person
comes to feel and think as the other person feels and thinks, and each is
aware that the other is aware how each is feeling and thinking. This suggests
that, for Nietzsche, empathy is more than a perception of another’s internal
state; it is a special form of imaginative or representational activity whose
function is to convey a sense of alliance and a kind of self-conscious like-
mindedness.
Some commentators seem to understand empathy as consisting only of
spontaneous as well as intentional mimicry reactions that do not translate to
knowing another’s emotional and cognitive state. Abbey, for instance,
writes, ‘those who appear to feel the same emotion as their neighbor are
really only successfully imitating its effects’. Thus, she concludes, ‘it looks
as if manifesting the signs of another’s emotions is the furthest that
fellow-feeling can go, for Nietzsche contends that it is almost impossible to
know exactly how another feels or what they suffer’ (2000, 63). For Abbey,
the empathic process exclusively relies on ‘emotion perception and repro-
duction’, or simply ‘mirroring’, and it never makes it to the next stage, i.e.,
‘representational emotional knowing’. Here Abbey appears to merge
Nietzsche’s discussion of empathy in D and his critique of compassion in
GS. It is true that in GS 338 Nietzsche claims that we cannot have direct
access to another’s subjective states. Nevertheless, this does not represent
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an obstacle to our ability to perceive another’s expressive communicative
behavior and ascribe to that person, in accordance with the representa-
tional content of our perceptual experience, a certain kind of mental
state. The mere fact that we cannot arrive at an exact understanding of
another’s expression of their feelings does not mean, for Nietzsche, that
our experience of another’s expressed emotional state will not yield any
knowledge of that person’s mental contents.
The analysis so far points to some marked contrasts between Nietzsche’s
and Schopenhauer’s understandings of empathy. Put simply, for Nietzsche,
empathy is about extending our imaginative capacity to simulate what
others are experiencing, ‘as if’ we can truly overcome our individuation
andexperience it ourselves. Such imaginative transformation,which involves
adopting another’s emotional perspective, imagining how we would feel if
we were them or really under those conditions, and making inferences
about their emotional states, plays an essential role in ultimately evoking
the phantasy of being one with others, i.e., ‘the phantasy of empathy’.
As a matter of fact, Nietzsche explicitly emphasizes the role of imagin-
ation in promoting empathy and prosocial behavior when he states, ‘We
have to have a strong power of imagination [eine starke Kraft der Einbildung]
to be able to feel compassion [Mitleid]’ (HH I 59; translation slightly modi-
fied). Nietzsche seems to offer two arguments for this claim. The first one
begins with the assumption that ‘no amount of experience with a person,
however near to us he may be, can be complete enough’ (HH I 32) to
provide a total appraisal [Gesammtabschätzung] of his emotional state. Per-
ception and observation alone are inadequate; something in addition is
required to transcend one’s frame of reference and construct new mean-
ings, something that suggests a relationship between social stimuli and
our ability to engage and build rapport with another human being.
Hence, Nietzsche infers that it is only through our imaginative capacities
that we can move from our egocentric personal experience to intersubjec-
tive emotional participation in another’s lived experience. The second one
is based on the observation that most people accept life as it unfolds itself,
‘precisely because each of them wills and affirms only his own life and does
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not step outside himself like those exceptions do: everything outside them-
selves is either not noticeable at all for them or at most a faint shadow’ (HH
I 33). ‘Thus’, Nietzsche concludes, ‘for the ordinary, everyday person, the
value of life rests solely upon him taking himself to be more important
than the world’ (HH I 33). This indirectly implies that some kind of
other-oriented, imaginative capacity is necessary for the enactment of
self-transcending prosocial behaviors and empathic recognition of
another’s perspective. Otherwise, as Nietzsche notes, ‘The great lack of
imagination [Der grosse Mangel an Phantasie] from which [the individual]
suffers makes him unable to empathize with [einfühlen] other beings, and
hence he participates in their fate and suffering as little as possible’
(HH I 33).11
The theory of empathy Nietzsche develops in D 142 resonates well with
contemporary psychological research on empathy, especially with what is
generally referred to as representational or simulation theories of
empathy. Despite their differences, what these theories share is the idea
that empathy relies on a simulational process that attempts to reproduce
another’s mental state in oneself by means of one’s own motivational and
emotional resources (Stueber 2006, 111). This aspect of Nietzsche’s
theory has not been given much attention, even though some commenta-
tors have made observations similar to mine. Mattia Riccardi, for instance,
distinguishes two types of simulational process behind empathy; one is a
reflexive, ‘human-specific mind-reading capacity’ based on behavior
interpretation, which I call ‘representational emotional knowing’, and
the other is ‘emotional mirroring or contagion’, which we have in
common with animals (2015, 229–230). However, I disagree with Riccardi
on a crucial point, going further than him, and demonstrate below that rep-
resentational emotional knowing is not necessarily specific to humans. For
11 Contemporary psychological studies support the hypothesis that the greater an individual’s
imagination, the more empathy the individual will show. See, for instance, Rabinowitz and
Heinhorn (1985). In a similar vein to Nietzsche, Eva-Maria Engelen (2011) suggests that
empathy ‘involves adopting the perspective of the other’s emotional state’, which ‘means
that empathetic activity is always already an activity of the imagination’.
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Nietzsche, human empathy must be seen in continuity with animal
empathic responding. Akshay Ganesh draws a similar distinction and pro-
poses that empathy involves a conscious process of emotional comparison
in which people seek to affiliate with others who are in similar experiential
situation (2017, 238). This phenomenon seems close to what I refer to
throughout this paper as ‘sympathetic affection’ or ‘sympathetic agree-
ment’. However, Ganesh does not attempt to flesh out the details of the
experiences of intersubjective affiliation, or at least, not as comprehensively
as I have done here.
Schopenhauer, of course, vehemently denies that such phantasy through
emotional imaging or automatic emulation of others’ emotional states accom-
panies and stimulates compassion. He says, ‘I must censure the error… that
compassion arises from an instantaneous deception of the imagination’
(BM 147). ‘This is by no means the case’, Schopenhauer reminds us; on the
contrary, we directly feel into the other’s inner experience, in the absence
of any separation between us and the other (BM 147). Or, in Schopenhauer’s
own words, ‘We suffer with him and hence in him; we feel his pain as his, and
do not imagine that it is ours’ (BM 147). Thus, Schopenhauer contends, any
appeal to our psychological capacities in order to explain compassion remains
at odds with the fact that compassion, as ametaphysical phenomenon, escapes
the realm of individuation altogether.
Another crucial difference between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer has to
do with their views on empathy’s connection to moral motivation. For Scho-
penhauer, through empathy one becomes not only aware of another’s
inner experiences, but also willing to help the other. For Nietzsche,
however, although our capacity for empathy allows navigating complexities
and fostering positive social connections with others, mental represen-
tation of others’ negative emotional states alone does not necessarily
entail other-oriented concern or empathic concern for their feelings and
needs. In other words, Nietzsche denies that empathy has a direct associ-
ation with other-oriented concern.
The second part of the discussion in D 142 only hints at an explanation
about the origins and evolutionary significance of emotion perception and
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reproduction in humans. Nietzsche speculates about what might
have originally facilitated empathic susceptibility. Put simply, he hypoth-
esizes that fear was a central element in early human psychology and
social relations. Humans feared other humans, especially those who are
deemed to pose a potential threat or are perceived as strangers. And
elsewhere Nietzsche characterizes this type of fear as a primary instinct
that contributes to the emergence of an empathic curiosity about the
thoughts and feelings of other people: such ‘fear wants to discern who
the other person is, what he can do and what he wants: to deceive
oneself here would mean danger and disadvantage’ (D 309). Nietzsche’s
theory seems to take the core function of this unique capability (i.e.,
Mitempfindung) to be at least threefold: to guide our fear responses, to
meditate social relations and make it easier to cooperate, and eventually
to bring in a bond of empathic concern for the well-being of others, or
sympathetic affection (sympathische Affection) between individuals, which
Nietzsche defines as ‘the drive for attachment and for the care of others’
(D 143).
According to Nietzsche’s quasi-evolutionary account, our ability to sub-
jectively experience and share in another’s psychological state or context,
which is based on a shared emotional representation of perceived action,
has a long evolutionary history behind it (D 142). In D 26, Nietzsche
works out the idea that humans further developed this ‘bestial’ skill of
sensing others’ experiential states and thereby deciding how to engage
interpersonally. The processes transforming early social behavior and
thus permitting the emergence of more mature emotions such as com-
passion, Nietzsche believes, involve ‘a fundamental remoulding [eine
gründliche Umbildung]’ and ‘adapting [anzupassen]’ of the individual con-
sciousness and behavior to the needs and ‘general requirements [den allge-
meinen Bedürfnissen]’ of social life (D* 132). ‘Everything’, Nietzsche says,
‘that in any way corresponds to this…membership-building drive [i.e.,
social instinct] and its ancillary drives is felt to be good’, and ‘individual
empathy and social feeling [Mitempfindung und sociale Empfindung] here
play into one another’s hands’ (D* 132). But how exactly has empathy
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emerged and developed? What played the key role in humans becoming
more empathetic?
For Nietzsche, empathy originates in mimicry: mimicry has played a
crucial role in the evolution of human sociality in providing the basis for
experiencing a prototypically other-oriented pattern of responses to
stimuli associated with distress in others, such as ‘the sympathetic’ and ‘gen-
erally useful social actions’ (D* 132). In D 26 (titled ‘Animals and moral-
ity’), Nietzsche singles out ‘what English researchers refer to as mimicry
[mit mimicry bezeichnen]’ as one of the key mechanisms involved in the rec-
ognition of others’ experiential states as well as the self-regulation of
emotional and behavioral responses. He writes in some detail about the
role of mimicry in aiding empathy-related social functioning and facilitat-
ing a sense of cooperative social bonding. The animal, Nietzsche maintains,
tends to assimilate other animals’ behavior and spontaneously monitor and
rely on others’ feelings for a wide range of purposes, such as to monitor and
modify its own behavior out of a ‘nose for safety’; to respond emotionally or
behaviorally to a stimulus in a manner that is adaptive and contextually
appropriate (e.g., many animals ‘adapt their colors to that of the environ-
ment’, or ‘many play dead or assume the shapes and colors of another
animal or of sand’, etc.); to cooperatively achieve joint goals and positive
outcomes efficiently (such as ‘to escape from predators and to gain advan-
tage in capturing prey’); and ultimately to gain self-control and higher self-
awareness: ‘It too observes the effect its actions have on the perceptions of
other animals and from there learns to look back at itself, to take itself
“objectively”; it has its degree of self-awareness’ (D 26). A key insight
here is that human sociality is evolutionarily continuous with animal social-
ity, differing from it not in kind but only in degree: ‘the loftiest human
being is elevated and refined only in the manner of his nourishment’
(D 26). Humans are sensitive and responsive to their environment and
the social climate in which they operate in a wider and more sophisticated
sense; yet, at bottom, they continue to share many of the same social ten-
dencies with animals. Through the samemirroring mechanisms underlying
the socially regulated behavior in animals, ‘the [human] individual
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conceals himself in the… society, or he adapts himself to princes, classes,
political parties, opinions of the time or place: and for all our subtle ways
of appearing happy, grateful, powerful, or in love, one can easily find the
relevant animal likeness’ (D 26).
The reference to ‘English researchers’ in D 26 indicates that Nietzsche’s
theory draws from and extends the important insights generated by the
contemporary research of his day. Nietzsche first came into contact with
evolutionary perspectives onmimicry probably through Lange’s discussions
of the Darwinian conception of mimicry and critical overview of the debate
among the British naturalists, A. R. Wallace and A. W. Bennett, about the
evolutionary origins of mimicry, whether it occurs due to natural selection.
It seems Nietzsche is particularly intrigued by the phenomenon of ‘protec-
tive mimicry’, i.e., the animal’s ability to adapt its form and color to its sur-
roundings as a protection against its enemies (see Lange, History of
Materialism, Vol. III, ‘Mimicry’, 48–51). His familiarity with these discussions
gives breadth and depth to his perspective on mimicry and its effects on
empathy and social behavior. We see Nietzsche in his later years drawing
even further on the concept of mimicry to explore human behavior to
describe how the weak strategically use their emotional mimicry skills to
insidiously undermine the resilience, strength, and confidence of the
strong (see TI ‘Anti-Darwin’). However, in his earlier writings, Nietzsche
seems to be more interested in the general function of mimicry to
improve social interactions than the menace of mimicry. For Nietzsche of
HH and D, mimicry’s function is not limited to protection against
enemies. Nietzsche proposes that animals also exhibit a basic ability to
extract information from stimuli via spontaneous mimicry, or automatic
‘mirroring’, and often appear to have a capacity, albeit in a limited form,
for ‘representational emotional knowing’, i.e., a capacity to represent
others’ emotional states and to identify and discriminate between different
emotional experiences.12 Hence Nietzsche writes, ‘The animal understands
12 It has been suggested that certain forms of consolation behavior in animals are influenced
by an empathic understanding of other individuals’ feelings (see De Waal 2015).
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all this just as well as the human being; it… judges the movements of its
enemies and friends, it learns their particularities by heart, it takes appro-
priate measures: it renounces battle once and for all against individuals
of a certain species and also divines in the approach of many types of
animals a readiness for peace and accord’ (D 26).13 It should also not be
overlooked that these passages finely illustrate Nietzsche’s emphasis on
the perception–action mechanisms by which animals actually engage with
the world, and how such sensitivity to particular movements and patterns
of movement in turn serves as a necessary condition to imitate, learn,
and remember more advanced forms of social behavior in higher
mammals and human beings.
For Nietzsche, our capacity to mimic and emulate socially relevant
actions, sensations, and experiences has a further crucial function. Put
simply, mimicry leads to a perceived similarity between self and other
(or, in Nietzsche’s words, ‘the phantasy of empathy, a feeling of being
somewhat alike’), and this in turn leads to an increased sense of interper-
sonal connectedness and communication, mutual liking, and the cultiva-
tion of a higher commitment to behavioral norms that are conducive to
forming and sustaining caring relationships with others (HH I 98).14
13 Here Nietzsche is possibly influenced by Schopenhauer, who attributes a lower-level associ-
ative reasoning to animals on the basis that ‘the knowledge of cause and effect… is a priori
inherent in animals’ (WWR I 23). He says, ‘all animals, even the most imperfect, have under-
standing, for they all know objects, and this knowledge as motive determines their movements’
(WWR I 21). Yet he acknowledges that ‘the degree of acuteness of [such] understanding varies
a great deal… between the different species of animals’ (WWR I 23). As an example, he men-
tions the case of an ‘elephant which, after crossing many bridges on his journey through
Europe, once refused to go on one, over which he saw the rest of the party of men and
horses crossing as usual, because it seemed to him too lightly built for his weight’ (WWR I
23). Another ‘special proof’ of the manifestation of understanding in animals, Schopenhauer
observes, is that ‘even a quite young dog does not venture to jump from the table, however
much he wants to, because he foresees the effect of the weight of his body, without,
however, knowing this particular case from experience’ (WWR I 23). He closes his discussion
with a crucial caveat, ‘in judging the understanding of animals, we must guard against ascrib-
ing to it a manifestation of instinct’ (WWR I 23).
14 A large body of empirical research supports Nietzsche’s contention about the pro-social
effects of affective mimicry and physiological synchronization. In an experimental work
28 Vasfi O. Özen
It is worth mentioning at this point that Nietzsche is quite modern in his
recognition of the communicative/pro-social function of mimicking the
behaviors of others, how one individual’s instinctive behavior can
provoke a similar behavior on the part of the other individual. In a
section titled ‘Gesture and speech’ from HH, Nietzsche curiously
remarks about the role of gestural and bodily expression of emotions as a
significant facilitator in enabling opportunities for individuals to experi-
ence a mutual understanding and psychological attachment:
Older than speech is the mimicking of gestures, which takes place
involuntarily and… so strong that we cannot look upon facial movements
without innervation of our own face (one can observe that feigned yawning
evokes a natural yawning in someone who sees it). The imitated gesture
led the person who was imitating back to the sensation that expressed itself in
(Maurer and Tindall 1983) focusing on the effects of mimicry on perceived empathy in coun-
selor–patient relationship, the results indicated that when counselors mimicked the non-
verbal behavior of their clients, they were perceived as expressing more empathy and
concern compared to when the counselors did not mimic their clients (qtd. in Van Baaren
et al. 2009, 33). In line with this work, other psychologists (Bavelas et al. 1987, 325) proposed
a model of elementary mimicry as a non-verbal communicative act, which is analogous to
verbal expression of ideas, thoughts, and feelings through speech and conversation. Put
simply, any behavior that occurs in a social context is potentially communicative. There is
always another individual in the situation when motor/affective mimicry occurs. This suggests
that mimicry is not to be understood simply as non-verbal behavior, or only expressive of one’s
own subjective state in response to the perceived emotional experience of the other person; it
is expressive to the other person as well. Specifically, it is a way of showing the one who is
mimicked, ‘I feel as you do’, and thereby conveying fellow feeling to the other person. In a
more recent experiment (Guéguen et al. 2011), in which a student-assistant mimicked or
failed to mimic a participant during a discussion session about paintings, and after the
event solicited the participant for a written feedback about an essay, it was found that
mimicry increased compliance to the assistant’s request. More specifically, mimicry served
in fostering a closer relationship and was associated with greater liking of the assistant. Accord-
ing to the researchers, this promises an explanation of the effect of mimicry on pro-social be-
havior, i.e., the link betweenmimicry and other-oriented concern. Put simply, helping another
person is a good strategy in fostering other-oriented prosocial behavior, and as the previous
studies (Burger et al. 2004) indicate, we are more likely to help people we like, or people
with whom we perceive ourselves to share a commonality of experiences (qtd. in Guéguen
et al. 2011, 3). The research then suggests that ‘if mimicry leads to more positively perceiving
someone and if mimicry is interpreted as the desire of the mimicker to create affiliation and
rapport, then this dual effect could explain why we help more favorably our mimicker’
(Guéguen et al. 2011, 3).
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the face or body of the person being imitated. Thus people learned to under-
stand one another; thus the child still learns to understand its mother. In
general, painful sensations may well have been expressed by gestures that
themselves caused pain…Conversely: gestures of pleasure were themselves
pleasurable and hence were easily adapted for the purposes of communi-
cative understanding (laughter as an expression of being tickled, which is
pleasurable, served for the expression of other pleasurable sensations
besides). (HH I 216)15
Nietzsche views the human tendency for sociality and affiliation as involving
progressively more sophisticated capacities such as understanding others’
emotional and mental states, engaging with others’ needs, and converting
sympathy into concern and hence to pro-social behavior. He believes, just
like in the case of animals, that it is the mechanisms of mimicry and imita-
tive behavior that give rise to empathy and pro-social behavior in humans. It
is crucial to note that Nietzsche’s approach here encompasses both biologi-
cal and social influences that underpin the development of other-oriented
prosocial tendencies, and we need to determine how exactly the biological
and social figure in his account. In an unpublished fragment from 1877,
Nietzsche writes the following about the nature and origin of ‘social
instinct’ or other-oriented drives:
Perhaps the unegoistic drive [Trieb] is a late development of the social instinct;
certainly not the other way around. The social instinct [sociale Trieb] emerges out
of the constraint that is exerted from interest for another being… or out of fear,
with its insight that we must work together so as not to perish individually. This
sensation [Empfindung], inherited, emerges later, without the original motive
becoming conscious; it has become the need that looks for the opportunity to
act. (KSA 8, 23[32], my translation)
15 Here Nietzsche seems to be anticipating a version of a contemporary hypothesis about the
human ability to imitate various action patterns which is simply known as ‘direct mapping’. Put
simply, direct mapping is based on the proposal that the observation of an action activates a
corresponding motor behavior in the observer. Observed actions are automatically mapped
from the visible movements of another to the perceptual and motor representations of the
observer during imitation. Some psychologists such as Perra and Gattis have asserted that
this hypothesis ‘appears consistent with behavioral evidence that infants can selectively
match the gestures of an adult model very early in life’ (2008, 134).
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Here Nietzsche seems to hold that social instinct is not primary, that is, the
human person is not essentially or inherently social, but rather becomes
social through his/her interactions with others, which enable him/her
to attune to others’ inner experiences, and vice versa. The instinct
towards sociality and group aggregation is not something deeply
grounded in human nature; rather it evolves and manifests in variable
and complex ways throughout life. The passage cited above also unam-
biguously states that other-oriented drives are not innate, but pre-
sumptively derived from our social instinct. There are indeed several
passages in HH and D that support Nietzsche’s early ideas about human
sociality.
In HH and D, Nietzsche places greater emphasis on the idea that good-
naturedness (Gutmüthigkeit), which is synonymous with being other-
oriented and sympathetic to others’ feelings, needs, and thoughts, was in
large part acquired in reaction to a specific stimulus (i.e., fear of others
and circumstances). Through their perceptions and interactions with
others, our ancestors began to adjust, and often suppress, their behavior
when they predicted an attack or as an attempt to avoid potentially dama-
ging conflicts and hence maximize the likelihood of survival. Many
coping skills (among which, of particular importance, is an ability to accu-
rately appraise and affectively attune to another’s experience with well-
meaning intentions) have been retained and socially passed on to the
next generations and cultivated through cultural customs: ‘Good-natured
people [Die Gutmüthigen] have acquired their character through the con-
stant fear, which their ancestors had, of foreign attack—they mollified,
pacified, wheedled up, bowed down, diverted, flattered, cowered, hid the
pain, the annoyance, smoothed back their features right away—and
finally they bequeathed this whole delicate, tried and true mechanism to
their children and grandchildren’ (D 310). Human beings, Nietzsche
claims, become good-natured mainly by means of emulation and imitation
(Nachmachen) of others (initially one’s parents) who take the initiative to
demonstrate and model what is socially ‘allegeable and acceptable’: ‘It is
evident that moral feelings are transmitted through a process whereby
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children perceive in their parents strong sympathies and antipathies toward
certain actions and, as born apes, imitate [nachmachen] these inclinations
and disinclinations’ (D 34). In a section titled ‘How seeming becomes
being’ from HH, Nietzsche goes even further and seems to suggest that
other-oriented benevolence is to an important extent a by-product of a
basic drive to imitate, and accordingly he seeks its origins in mere human
imitativeness: ‘The profession of almost everyone… begins with… a
mimicking from the outside [Nachmachen von Aussen], with a copying
[Copiren] of what is effective. Anyone who always wears the mask of a
friendly countenance must finally acquire a power over benevolent disposi-
tions without which the expression of friendliness cannot be compelled to
appear—and finally they acquire power over him, he is benevolent’ (HH I
51). In brief, for Nietzsche, human beings have innate other-oriented
psychological dispositions that are relatively unsophisticated and auto-
matic, and these must be developed and built upon through social
mimicry and gestural–behavioral imitation to yield complicated and cogni-
tively rich other-oriented psychological dispositions such as empathy and
compassion.
The capacity for imitation and affective attunement is the key to human
sociality and communication. Broadly construed, Nietzsche understands a
‘drive to imitate’ as an innate disposition to mirror others’ behavioral
and emotional state. He regards this drive as a precursor to developing
social instinct and sympathetic affection towards others. As I see it, for
Nietzsche, empathy is an acquired skill that provides an early foundation
for the development of other-oriented behavioral tendencies. This
interpretation comes closer to John Richardson’s, according to which,
social instinct is ‘a drive to copy, i.e., a disposition to imitate others, to
want to do the same as they do’ which ‘is so basic and long-standing a
product of social selection that it has become a stable drive itself’ (2004,
86). According to Richardson, natural selection explains our basic animal
instincts and drives that are thought to be passed on through genetic
inheritance. Social selection, on the other hand, explains our more
peculiarly human sensibilities, which we acquire in a non-genetic way,
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solely by mimicking, remembering, and internalizing the customs, norms,
and behaviors of the members of a given group. The function of social
selection is principally to modify andmanipulate those drives and behaviors
that are originally designed solely for the organism’s own survival and
reproduction, and to redirect them towards goals serving the overall
fitness and success of the social unit. In other words, social selection
through customs and social habits constantly function to oppose and
suppress the drives that are inherited through natural selection (2004,
81–84). Nietzsche, Richardson points out, understands this essentially
antagonistic process as the taming (Zähmung) or domestication (Domestika-
tion) of human’s animal nature (2004, 145). Richardson takes Nietzsche’s
claim to be that empathy and other-oriented concern evolve through the
processes of socialization ‘and not by natural selection’, but with a crucial
qualification. Natural selection continues to provide ‘various antecedents’
and ‘raw materials’ for the generation of other-oriented prosocial ten-
dencies, which are solely in the service of social instinct to constantly
broaden the range of cooperation and foster a sense of alliance or group
belonging (2004, 148). Or put in Nietzsche’s words, empathic concern is
understood primarily to be a derivative of the ‘membership-building
drive and its ancillary drives’ (D* 132).
Paul Katsafanas, on the other hand, expresses a firm disagreement
with Richardson on this matter: ‘Consider Richardson’s suggestion that
naturally selected drives aim at individual preservation while socially
selected customs and habits aim at their own preservation (Richardson
2004, 82–84). I think Nietzsche’s view is more complex. Many of our
drives are inherently social’ (2016, 213). Katsafanas then mentions our
‘drive toward sociality’ (WS 70), ‘good-naturedness (Gutmüthigkeit)’,
‘friendliness’, and ‘politeness of the heart’ (HH I 49) as examples of inher-
ently social dispositions, which do not need to be seen to evolve under the
influence of social selection. Katsafanas says, ‘I cannot discern any textual
basis for [Richardson’s reading]. Nietzsche calls these inherently social
behaviors drives (Triebe), and he seems to treat them as coeval with the
more egoistic drives’ (2016, 213). Katsafanas argues against Richardson’s
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contention that socialization transcends the antagonistic effects of natural
selection and ultimately shapes our other-oriented dispositional character-
istics. Rather, he suggests, customs and social context serve as a necessary
condition for our completely innate other-oriented drives to develop and
be expressed.
I disagree with Katsafanas: on Nietzsche’s view, empathic concern and
social bonds are not entirely rooted in natural or innate tendencies. I
believe that Katsafanas fails to consider the significance of social and cul-
tural factors that contribute to the evolution and development of
empathy and other-oriented prosocial tendencies. The textual evidence
suggests, pace Katsafanas, that empathy and our feelings of concern about
the welfare of others cannot be explained in terms of innate or biological
tendencies alone. My account, like those of Richardson and Katsafanas, dis-
tinguishes various psychological and social factors that are associated with
empathy; yet it overcomes the weaknesses of both. Katsafanas is right to
claim that, on Nietzsche’s view, human beings have some natural other-
oriented psychological dispositions; however, he fails to note that these
are relatively unsophisticated dispositions. They do not include more
complex social instincts and accompanying emotional attitudes such as
empathy. For this reason, Richardson is right to deny that all other-oriented
psychological dispositions are simply selected through natural selection.
Yet, he goes too far in claiming that they are almost entirely the result of
socialization.
To sum up what has been discussed so far, according to Nietzsche, the
ways in which we synchronize with (i.e., mimic) others’ somatic states,
especially feeling along with others’ positive emotions, play a central role
in forging a sense of rapport or sympathetic relation between individuals.
In other words, social instinct and other-oriented inclinations grow out of
and along with intersubjective feelings of pleasure. Nietzsche further
hypothesizes that the pleasant sympathetic feeling that arises out of our
mutual susceptibility to one another’s experiential state is predictor of
other-oriented concern and motivation to help. Nietzsche’s theory of
empathy through mimicry and mirroring, and its corollary idea that
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building a mutual understanding and psychological bonding through
mimicry initially contributes to the development of fellow-feeling and
other-oriented prosocial attitudes, remains an intriguing working hypoth-
esis, but the details are murky. More specifically, Nietzsche seems able to
demonstrate how empathy emerges independent of a motivational com-
ponent (i.e., emphatic concern), yet he does not explain how exactly the
gradual development of more mature emotions such as compassion occurs.
To further elucidate Nietzsche’s theory, we can now place it in the
context of his criticism of Schopenhauer. Empathy, pace Schopenhauer,
is originally amoral; it lacks the motivational component of compassion.
Empathy emerges basically as an ability to perceive the expressions of
other people, which, in turn, makes it possible to evaluate how they per-
ceive us. As emphasized above, empathy has several non-moral functions
that arise along with it, especially those related to its positive role in
social life, its relation to fear and adaptations to the challenges of one’s
environment with appropriate coping skills. Many of those behaviors and
capacities are for the sake of the empathizing subject, not for the sake of
another person. According to Schopenhauer, empathy can arise only
from one’s ability to see through (durchsehen) the illusory principle of indi-
viduation and recognize the metaphysical unity of all beings over the
divided world of phenomena. Nietzsche outright denies that empathy
requires the sort of intuitive awareness of numerical oneness Schopen-
hauer describes (D 142). Rather, for Nietzsche, empathy emerged in
humans from a basic capacity to imitate, mirror, and represent what is
different from oneself. According to Schopenhauer, it is impossible to
empathize with another’s experience unless it becomes at some point
one’s own. Nietzsche elsewhere illustrates the ‘presumptuousness’ of this
claim in relation to a discussion about the ‘delusion on the part of great
actors that the historical personages they portray really felt the same as
they do during their portrayal’ (D 324). What these actors, whoever they
are, fail to grasp is, Nietzsche observes, that ‘their power of imitation and
divination, which they would gladly have us believe is a clairvoyant
faculty, penetrates just barely enough to capture gestures, voice tones
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and looks, and what is altogether external; that is to say, they snatch the
shadow of the soul of a great hero, statesman, warrior, of a person of ambi-
tion, jealousy, despair; they push in close to the soul but never into the spirit
of their subject’ (D 324). In empathy, we do not undergo the same token
experience as the other. Clearly, we cannot directly enter into another’s
experiential space. Hence Nietzsche’s rebuke of Schopenhauer: ‘to view
and take in the experiences of others as if they were our own—as is the
imperative of a philosophy of compassion … stop all your fantasizing!’
(D 137). In other words, there is a naturalistic way of viewing and taking
in the experiences of others—one that does not take refuge in fantastical
assumptions. Having laid out the antecedents and conditions that give
rise to and promote the development of other-oriented concern, I want
now to leave behind the question of how empathic concern emerges and
consider Nietzsche’s views on its value.
3. Fellow Feeling and Sympathetic Affection
Schopenhauer claims that, during empathy, the other is no longer experi-
enced as a separate being; empathy consists in a self-transcendent feeling of
oneness, i.e., ‘one individual’s again recognizing in another his own self,
his own true inner nature’ (BM 209). In other words, empathy reveals some-
thing real to us about the world, the identity of all beings, or more specifi-
cally, the one indivisible will which is the ‘in-itself’ of all things. Therefore,
its ‘significance goes beyond the mere phenomenal appearance of things,
and so also beyond all possibility of experience’ (BM 200). These assump-
tions about the self-transcendent function of empathy and its relation to a
heightened sense of fellow feeling continued to be defended after Scho-
penhauer. Vischer (1873), for instance, notes in a similar vein that
empathy is elicited by ‘a mental renunciation and dissipation of the self-
feeling’ (Über das optische Formgefühl, 29; my translation). And he claims
that only because of an increased sense of self-other merging are we able
to experience a sympathetic response to the perception of another’s suffer-
ing: ‘the empathy [Mitempfindung] and the fellow feeling [Mitgefühl] that
we might have, for instance, for a wounded soldier lead to a deep emotional
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participation [einer tiefen Gemütsteilnahme] as we expand our transposed,
compassionate self [mitleidende Ich] into a general human self in such a
way that the purity of the entire human existence appears embittered by
this one image of suffering’ (Über das optische Formgefühl, 29; my translation).
Yet, for Nietzsche, empathy does not result in the perception and experi-
ence of oneness that transcends the phenomenal boundaries of body, time,
and space, and which Schopenhauer sees as facilitating moral motivation.
Nietzsche speaks merely of an imagined sense of connectedness, ‘the phan-
tasy of empathy’, in the sense of an emotional identification with another
individual. Individuals affected by common experiences (of suffering or
joy) can overcome differences in responding to those experiences. Experi-
encing things with similar consciousness, i.e., observing our emotional
response to something mirrored in others’ emotional response to that
thing, can be in turn productive of a perceived sense of unity or feelings
of belongingness to a group and similarity to other group members. But
this sense of unity or fellow feeling does not require a sort of literal trans-
cendence of personal boundaries.
Having touched upon Nietzsche’s reflections on fellow feeling and how
it can facilitate a bond of sympathetic affection, care, and strong attach-
ment, I would like to discuss his views on the value of sympathetic affection.
Nietzsche’s theory of empathy in D is deeply colored by his negative assess-
ment of sympathetic affection. Right after the section where he introduces
his theory of empathy, Nietzsche launches his critique of sympathetic affec-
tion and how our inability to temper our empathic tendencies can actually
undermine our own and others’ physical and psychological health. The
passage is worth citing at length:
Woe to us if this drive ever rages!—Supposing the drive for attachment and for
the care of others (the ‘sympathetic affection’) were twice as strong as it is;
then life on earth would be unbearable. Merely consider all the foolishness
each of us commits out of attachment and care for ourselves, daily and
hourly, and how insufferable we are in the process: what would it be like if
we became for others the object of the same foolishness and importunities
with which up until now they had only plagued themselves! Wouldn’t we
take blind flight the moment the next person drew near? And heap the
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same imprecations on sympathetic affection that we currently heap on egotism?
(D 143)
It is important to note that the above passage should not be read as
Nietzsche’s rejection of empathic concern, or his final word on its value.
Here Nietzsche is simply concerned to point out that our other-oriented
affective dispositions should not come at the expense of neglecting the
well-being of all involved. While a shortage of empathy or excessive ego-
centrism is regrettable, so is a surplus of empathy in the form of constant
caring, benevolence, and attentiveness to others. This is why Nietzsche else-
where says that ‘Goodness and love, as the most salutary herbs and powers
in human affairs, are such precious discoveries that we might well wish to
proceed as economically as possible in using these balsamic remedies’
(HH I 48). Being economical with our kindness and goodness is not only
a prudent way to spare ourselves the psychological torment and humiliation
of becoming one another’s passive objects of love and benevolence, but it is
also a necessity to empower ourselves with positive affirmations and serve as
an inspiration for many.
This points to a crucial issue that Nietzsche wants his readers to recog-
nize. He hypothesizes that having a sympathetic disposition is strongly posi-
tively correlated with an inability to rejoice in others’ joy and stand with
them in solidarity. He says people who are ‘sympathetic and always
helpful in misfortune are rarely as likely to share in joy: when others are for-
tunate, they have nothing to do, are superfluous, feel as if they no longer
possess their superior position, and hence easily manifest discontent’
(HH I 321). Here Nietzsche’s account bears close similarities to Schopen-
hauer’s understanding of the phenomenological aspects of sympathetic
affection. For Schopenhauer, empathic distress is the core state operative
in empathic concern. That is, his understanding of empathic concern is
solely conditional on co-suffering, for he says: ‘only another’s suffering,
want, danger, and helplessness awaken our sympathy directly and as
such’ (BM 146). Even though Nietzsche appears to agree with this assump-
tion, his theory affords a richer and more positive account of sympathetic
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affection and the motivational economy (i.e., the actual motivating forces)
that is embodied in other-oriented concern. Nietzsche believes that even
though other-oriented concern is triggered and unfolds primarily in situ-
ations involving someone who is suffering or in distress, we can also be
motivated by pleasure to assist others who we take to be like ourselves (D
133). In other words, for Nietzsche, we are typically motivated by another’s
distress to help, but often (if not always) empathic concern can be elicited
by a sense of likeness to another person as well as by mutual feelings of plea-
sure and enjoyment.
To be fair to Schopenhauer, he recognizes the pleasure involved in
other-oriented concern when he says, ‘[i]t is true that we can take
pleasure in the good fortune, well-being, and enjoyments of others’ (BM
146). Yet he differs from Nietzsche on the motivating force of this experi-
ence, for he says, ‘but then this [pleasure] is secondary, brought by the
fact that their suffering and privation had previously distressed us’ (BM
146). Here Schopenhauer’s reasoning depends on a particular phenomen-
ological story, according to which suffering is the positive, essential
element of life, something that ‘automatically makes itself known’, thus
more likely to serve as an immediate motivation for action, whereas satis-
faction and pleasure are regarded negatively, as ‘the mere elimination of
[suffering]’ (BM 146). Thus, the pleasure felt when we act out of sympath-
etic affection is taken to be merely epiphenomenal (i.e., an inefficacious by-
product) and by itself it cannot move us to action; empathic concern arises
only out of one’s susceptibility or willingness to be exposed to another’s
suffering.
Although Nietzsche endorses Schopenhauer’s general claim that suffer-
ing is essential to life, he rejects Schopenhauer’s negative conception of
pleasure (specifically his dismissal of pleasure as a potential motivational
determinant of sympathetic affection). With this in mind, I would like to
finally turn back to the Nietzsche of HH, who offers a different, and
more positive, assessment of the value of sympathetic affection. In HH,
Nietzsche seeks to argue that joy or an expectation of pleasure is causally
efficacious in motivating empathic concern. He also contends that only
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when we take our capacity for joy to its fullest expression through influen-
cing, shaping, and taking satisfaction from others’ achievement, advance-
ment, and happiness, do we embody genuine concern for others: ‘one
that has a rich capacity to share in the joys of others, wins friends every-
where, feels affection for all that is growing and becoming, shares the plea-
sure of others in all their honors and successes’ (HH I 614). For Nietzsche,
the best way to promote human flourishing and meaning in life is through
mutually fulfilling, uplifting, and inspiring connections with others, and
especially in tandem with a capacity for shared joy. He makes this point
more sharply in the unpublished fragments from the period of HH II.
He emphasizes, for instance, that we should ‘rejoice in such a way that
our joy is useful to others’ (UFHH 42 [31]). More specifically, we should
‘have joy in one another, up to the point where one promotes the
other’s direction’ (UFHH 27 [95]). Nietzsche describes his vision of sym-
pathetic affection in terms of self-growth and solidarity among individuals:
‘Friends, we take joy in one another as in fresh growth of nature and have
regard for one another: thus we grow beside one another like trees, and
precisely for that reason stretched upward and straight, because we
extend ourselves by means of one another’ (UFHH 31 [9]). In the final
analysis, Nietzsche offers a more nuanced perspective, according to
which it is not a general sensitivity to suffering per se (i.e., one’s ability to
recognize distress in others and experience sadness in response), but a
capacity to celebrate another’s overcoming of struggles, to delight in the
joy of their happiness and achievements that leads to genuine empathic
concern.
4. Concluding Remarks
My objective in this paper has been to reconstruct Nietzsche’s psychological
views on empathy as well as trace the history of certain ideas and possible
lines of influence on Nietzsche’s thought. My analysis shows three things.
First, what seems most characteristic of Nietzsche of HH and D is his proac-
tive disregard for metaphysical ideas and the faith in naturalistic
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explanation of phenomena, especially of humanmoral experience, and the
way in which Nietzsche always tries to substantiate his explanations with rel-
evant evidence and critical reflection in the scientific spirit of truth-seeking.
Second, as I mentioned above, Nietzsche’s account does not fully
explain the relationship between empathy and sympathy or the emergence
of more mature sympathetic affects such as compassion to others. I specu-
late the reason to this is that Nietzsche believed that he found support for
his ideas in scientific literature of his time about the affective mechanisms
underlying empathic arousal, and therefore he did not see the need for
further inquiry. We know that Nietzsche sifted through the psychological
literature of his time carefully and presumably drew the most decisive
support for his theory of empathy from the French physician Charles
Féré’s Sensation et mouvement: études expérimentales de psycho-mécanique (Sen-
sation and movement: experimental studies of psycho-mechanics, 1887).16
Spurred by his readings of Féré, Nietzsche later made the following
remark about the connection between empathy and sympathy: ‘Empathy
with the souls of others [Das Sichhineinleben in andere Seelen] is originally
nothing moral [ursprünglich nichts Moralisches], but a physiological suscepti-
bility to suggestion: “sympathy”… is merely a product of that psychomotor
rapport which is reckoned a part of spirituality (induction psycho-motrice,
Charles Féré thinks)’ (Nachlass 1888, 14 [119]). ‘Psychomotor induction’
(induction psycho-motrice), a term Nietzsche appropriates from Féré, is
meant to describe a basic tendency to imitate observed actions.17 The
same underlying mechanisms of empathy that Nietzsche describes in D
142 are essential for Féré as well, especially an automatic ability to
monitor another’s behavior and adapt one’s own according to its
effect. Féré suggests that the ways in which we synchronize with (i.e.,
mimic) others’ somatic states, especially feeling along with others’
16 Brobjer cites Féré as one of the chief influences on Nietzsche’s physiologically laden dis-
courses in the late 1880s (‘Nietzsche’s Reading and Knowledge of Natural Science: An Over-
view’, 45). To my knowledge, no commentator has ever analyzed the parallels between
Nietzsche’s and Féré’s views on empathy and sympathy.
17 For Féré’s own description of this phenomenon, see Sensation et mouvement, 15–16.
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positive emotions, play a central role in forging a sense of rapport or sym-
pathetic relation between individuals. He also contends that our other-
oriented prosocial tendencies ‘can be explained physiologically’, simply
by appealing to our susceptibility to the phenomenon of psychomotor
induction, or our spontaneous social use of imitation. An attempt at
such explanation is to be found in his Sensation et movement: ‘Reciprocal
induction multiplies emotion; that is what we often see in assemblies.
The expression of pleasure, painted on another face, increases our own
pleasure; from which it follows that one has interest in provoking the
pleasure of the other to increase one’s own’ (Sensation et mouvement,
16–17, my translation). In other words, the pleasant sympathetic
feeling that arises out of our mutual susceptibility to one another’s
experiential state is predictor of a deeper sense of concern and care
for the other (i.e., what Nietzsche calls ‘sympathetic affection’). In a
similar vein, Nietzsche states that it is integral to the ‘feelings of sympathy
[den mitleidenden Empfindungen]’ that ‘by doing as one pleases, one person
gives pleasure to another’ (D 76). Féré goes further and highlights, in a
quite Nietzschean fashion, the role of pleasure in being useful to
others and satisfaction of doing good as a major determinant of the
occurrence of sympathetic affection.18 He writes: ‘to be useful to
others… is pleasant in itself; it is better to give than to receive. Some indi-
viduals show a strong preference for those who consent to seek services
from them; they have gratitude to those who give them the opportunity
to give’ (Sensation et mouvement, 70, my translation). Again, this aptly
echoes Nietzsche’s remark that social instinct and other-oriented incli-
nations grow out of and along with intersubjective feelings of pleasure
(HH I 98), or that ‘the happiness and at the same time the sacrifice of
the individual lies in feeling himself to be a useful member and instru-
ment of the whole’ (D 132).
18 It should be noted, however, that pleasure plays a much smaller role starting in The Gay
Science.
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Third, it seems interesting as a future direction of research to explore
further, based on what has been argued in this paper, the methodological
continuity between HH, D, and Nietzsche’s later, more familiar works.
Nietzsche’s arguments in HH and D rely on a naturalistic framework in
which the only way that we can know anything meaningful about human
nature is via observation and empirical investigation. He criticizes meta-
physical theories that trace the origin of moral sensations beyond the
phenomenal, to an in-itself that is apart from our observation. Later on,
he radically extends this naturalistic analysis to the study of the history of
moral concepts and their influence on the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors
of people. For instance, in the Genealogy, Nietzsche goes to great lengths to
illuminate the social and psychological origins of non-moral concepts such
as debt and purity and show how they are later transfigured into moral con-




Aaltola, Elisa. 2018. Varieties of Empathy: Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics. London:
Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.
Abbey, Ruth. 2000. Nietzsche’s Middle Period. New York: Oxford University Press.
Acampora, Christa Davis. 2013. Contesting Nietzsche. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Ansell-Pearson, Keith and Bamford, Rebecca. 2020. Nietzsche’s Dawn: Philosophy,
Ethics, and the Passion of Knowledge. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ansell-Pearson, Keith and Ure, Michael Vincent. 2017. ‘Contra Kant: Experimental
ethics in Guyau and Kant.’ In Nietzsche’s Engagements with Kant and the Kantian
19 I am especially grateful to Scott Jenkins for his extensive comments on various drafts of this
paper. I extend my gratitude to Matthew Meyer and Paul Katsafanas for their astute remarks
and suggestions for improving this paper. I also thank all my reviewers for carefully reading my
paper and for their suggestions.
Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy 43
Legacy; Volume II: Nietzsche and Kantian Ethics, edited by João Constâncio and Tom
Bailey, 257–289. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Bamford, Rebecca. 2007. ‘The Virtue of Shame: Defending Nietzsche’s critique of
Mitleid.’ In: Nietzsche and Ethics, edited by Gudrun Von Tevenar, 241–262.
Bern: Peter Lang.
———. 2018. ‘Dawn.’ In The Nietzschean Mind, edited by Paul Katsafanas, 25–40.
New York: Routledge.
Bavelas, J. B., A. Black, C. R. Lemery, and J. Mullett. 1987. ‘Motor mimicry as primi-
tive empathy.’ In Cambridge Studies in Social and Emotional Development. Empathy
and its Development, edited by N. Eisenberg and J. Strayer, 317–338. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Brobjer, Thomas H. 2004. ‘Nietzsche’s Reading and Knowledge of Natural Science:
An Overview.’ In Nietzsche and Science, edited by Gregory Moore and Thomas H.
Brobjer, 21–51. London/New York: Routledge.
Burger, Jerry M., Nicole Messian, Shebani Patel, Alicia del Prado, and Carmen
Anderson. 2004. ‘What a Coincidence: The Effects of Incidental Similarity on
Compliance.’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (30): 35–43.
DeWaal, F. B. M. 2015. ‘Prosocial primates.’ InOxford Library of Psychology. The Oxford
Handbook of Prosocial Behavior, edited by D. A. Schroeder andW. G. Graziano, 61–
85. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Engelen, Eva-Maria. 2011. ‘Empathy and Imagination.’ Conference: American Philosophical
Association, Pacific Division, San Diego. DOI: 10.13140/2.1.1372.8808.
Féré, Charles. 1887. Sensation et Mouvement: études Expérimentales de Psycho-Mécanique.
Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière et Cie.
Frazer, Michael L. 2006. ‘The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy
and Strength.’ The Review of Politics 68: 49–78.
Frevert, Ute. 2011. Emotions in History: Lost and Found. Budapest: Central European
University Press.
Ganesh, Akshay. 2017. ‘Nietzsche onHonor and Empathy.’ Journal of Nietzsche Studies
48 (2): 219–244.
Guéguen, Nicolas, Meineri, Sebastien and Martin, Angelique. 2011. ‘Mimicry and
Helping Behavior: An Evaluation of Mimicry on Explicit Helping Request.’
The Journal of Social Psychology 151 (1): 1–4.
44 Vasfi O. Özen
Harris, Daniel I. 2017. ‘Compassion and Affirmation in Nietzsche.’ Journal of
Nietzsche Studies 48 (1): 17–28.
Katsafanas, Paul. 2016. The Nietzschean Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lange, Frederick Albert. 1880. History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present
Importance. Vol. II. Translated by E. C. Thomas. Houghton: Osgood and
Company.
Leiter, Brian. 2002. Nietzsche on Morality. New York: Routledge.
Maurer, R. E., and Tindall, J. H. 1983. ‘Effect of Postural Congruence on Client’s
Perception of Counselor Empathy.’ Journal of Counseling Psychology (30): 158–
163.
Müller, Johannes. 1835. Handbuch der Physiologie. Coblenz: Verlag von
J. Hölscher.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1974. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Vintage Books [GS].
———. 1980. Kritische Studienausgabe. 15 Bände. Edited by G. Colli and M.Montinari.
Berlin: De Gruyter [KSA].
———. 1982. ‘Twilight of the Idols.’ In The Portable Nietzsche, edited and translated by
Walter Kaufmann, 463–564. New York: Penguin Books [TI].
———. 1988. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1882-1884. Edited by G. Colli and M.
Montinari. Berlin: De Gruyter [Nachlass].
———. 1989. Beyond Good & Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Translated by
Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books [BGE].
———. 1995. Human, All Too Human. Vol. I. Translated by Gary Handwerk.
Stanford: Stanford University Press [HH I].
———. 1997. Daybreak. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press [D*].
———. 2011. Dawn. Translated by Brittain Smith. Stanford: Stanford University
Press [D].
———. 2012. ‘The Wanderer and His Shadow.’ In Human, All Too Human. Vol. I.
Translated by Gary Handwerk. Stanford: Stanford University Press [WS].
———. 2013. ‘Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human
II (Spring 1878–Fall 1879).’ In Human, All Too Human. Vol. II. Translated by
Gary Handwerk. Stanford: Stanford University Press [UFHH].
Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy 45
Panaïoti, Antoine. 2013. Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Perra, O. and M. Gattis. 2008. ‘Reducing the mapping between perception and
action facilitates imitation.’ British Journal of Developmental Psychology 26 (1):
133–144.
Preston, Stephanie D. 2007. ‘A perception–action model for empathy.’ In Empathy
in Mental Illness, edited by T. Farrow and P. Woodruff, 428–447. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Rabinowitz, Aaron and Heinhorn, Lea. 1985. ‘Empathy and Imagination.’
Imagination, Cognition and Personality 4 (3): 305–312.
Riccardi, Mattia. 2015. ‘Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency.’
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3): 221–243.
Richardson, John. 2004. Nietzsche’s New Darwinism. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1966. The World as Will and Representation. Vol. I. Translated
by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications [WWR].
———. 1995. On the Basis of Morality. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Berghahn
[BM].
Stellar, Jennifer E., Gordon, Amie M., Piff, Paul K., Cordaro, Daniel, Anderson,
Craig L., Bai, Yang, Maruskin, Laura A., and Keltner, Dacher. 2017 ‘Self-
Transcendent Emotions and Their Social Functions: Compassion, Gratitude,
and Awe Bind Us to Others Through Prosociality.’ Emotion Review 9 (3): 1–8.
Stueber, Karsten R. 2006. Rediscovering Empathy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Van Baaren, R. B., J. Decety, A. Dijksterhuis, A. van der Leij, and M. L van Leeuwen.
2009. ‘Being imitated: Consequences of nonconsciously showing empathy.’ In
Social Neuroscience. The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, edited by J. Decety and W.
Ickes, 31–42. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vischer, Robert. 1873. Über das optische Formgefühl. Ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik. Leipzig:
Hermann Credner.
Von Tevenar, Gudrun. 2007. ‘Nietzsche’s objections to pity and compassion.’ In
Nietzsche and Ethics, edited by Gudrun Von Tevenar, 263–282. Bern: Peter Lang.
46
